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Abstract
The capital structure of a company consists of a particular combination of debt and equity issues to 
relieve potential pressures on its long-term financing. To examine such issues, many theories have 
been developed in the literature and they generally focus upon what determinants are likely to 
influence the so-called leverage decisions of the firms. Among these, the MM theory, trade-off theory 
and signaling theory have been said to mainly play a crucial role in identifying and testing the various 
properties of the leverage decisions. This paper briefly tries to define the fundamentals underlying 
these theories and evaluates whether some a priori assumed macroeconomic determinants can be 
related to the leverage parameters of interest examined in the paper. For this purpose, we conduct 
an empirical research that covers 90 selected firms traded at the BSE Stock Exchange. For the 
empirical analysis panel data methodology has been applied. The study period is 2002-2009. From 
this, it is hoped that we are able to highlight the issue of what properties the leverage ratios have and 
to satisfy our curiosity about how can the macroeconomic determinants affect the leverage ratios 
under various groupings such as tangibility, size, growth opportunities, profitability and non-debt tax 
shields. Our main results reveal that there is a negative and statistically significant relationship 
between non-debt tax shields and size and debt and there is a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between growth and ratio of fixed assets to total assets debt. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
The root of the modern capital structure theory arises from the seminal paper by Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) popularly termed as the MM theory. The MM theory states that, based on the 
assumptions of the an absence of brokerage, tax and bankruptcy costs, investors can borrow at the 
same rate as corporations and they would tend to have the same information as management about 
a firm’s future investment opportunities. The MM theory proves that under some restrictions, a 
firm’s value would be unaffected by its capital structure and thus assumes that earnings before 
income tax would not have been related to the use of debt, leading to the inference that capital 
structure may be irrelevant. Despite the fact that some of the fundamental assumptions of the 
theory were unrealistic in the eyes of investors and other economic agents, the MM theory was 
generally accepted and subsequent research focused on relaxing some of its assumptions in order to 
develop a more realistic approach. In this sense, Modigliani and Miller published another paper in 
1963 considering some of the criticisms or deficiencies of their theory and relaxed the assumption1
that there were no corporate taxes. Further, other assumptions were later relaxed to build the trade 
off theory, which suggests that a firm’s target leverage is determined by taxes and costs of financial 
distress and thus the interest payments tend to be tax deductible making debt less expensive than the 
use of equity financing. Further developments in the same line were made with the development of 
pecking order theory of Myers (1984). It states that firms prioritize their sources of financing - from 
internal financing to equity issues according to the law of least effort, or of least resistance, 
preferring to raise equity as a financing means of last resort. Hence, internal funds are likely to be 
used first, and only when they are depleted will the firms to realize new equity issues. This theory 
maintains that businesses adhere to a hierarchy of financing sources and prefer internal financing 
when available, and debt is preferred over equity if external financing is required. The theory 
suggests that the firms consider external finance if and only if internal finance has not been 
sufficient. In case of using external financing, the firms issue the cheapest security first so they start 
with debt, and then possibly apply hybrids such as convertible bonds, and going to equity only as a 
last resort. In contrast to the trade-off theory, there is no well-defined target leverage ratio in the 
pecking order theory: the debt ratio varies when there is an imbalance between internal funds and 
real investment opportunities. In this study, we have attempted to identify the critical factors
affecting the capital structure of Indian firms. For the purpose of analysis, a panel model has been 
estimated for the years 2002 to 2009. The study finds a negative and statistically significant 
relationship between non-debt tax shields and size and debt. There is a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between growth and ratio of fixed assets to total assets debt. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses about some possible determinants of 
the capital structure of the firms and provides empirical evidences. The third section briefly deals 
with the estimation methodology and data source. The fourth section presents the results, whilst the 
discussions on results have been presented in section five. The last section concludes the paper.
                                                          
1 The underlying rationale for the MM theory is that solely the left hand side of the balance sheet, which reflects the 
company’s investment policy (Drobez and Fix, 2003), determines the value of the firm. Therefore, their theory suggests 
that the value of the firm tends to be independent from the debt balance of the company, and instead is largely affected 
by the presence of a number of projects handled with positive net present value (NPV).
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND MACROECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF 
THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE
The empirical literature suggests a number of factors that may influence the financial structure of
firms. For example, Harris and Raviv (1991) suggest that the leverage of firms tends to be affected 
by fixed assets, investment opportunities, advertising expenditures, the possibility of bankruptcy, and 
profitability and uniqueness of the product. Salawu (2006) revealed that ownership structure and 
management control, growth and opportunity, profitability, issuing cost, and tax issues associated 
with debt are the major factors influencing bank's capital structure. Following Rajan and Zingales 
(1995); Banerages, Heshmati and Wihlborg (2000) and Bevan and Danbolt (2001) we have taken
company size, profitability, tangibility, growth opportunities and non-debt tax shields as the possible 
determinants of capital structure. We discuss the relevant literature for each of these variables below.
The nature of a firm’s assets has impact on capital structure. Tangible assets are less subject to 
informational asymmetries and usually they have a greater value than intangible assets in the event of 
bankruptcy. In addition, moral hazard risks are reduced when the firm offers tangible assets as 
collateral, because this constitutes a positive signal to the creditors. Creditors can sell off these assets 
in the event of default. Hence, the trade off theory predicts a positive relationship between measures 
of leverage and the proportion of tangible assets. However, empirical evidences relating to this are 
mixed. For example, Bradley et al., (1984); Rajan and Zingales (1995); Kremp et al., (1999) and 
Frank and Goyal (2002) find leverage to be positively related to the level of tangibility. However, 
Chittenden et al., (1996) and Bevan and Danbolt (2001) find the relationship between tangibility and 
leverage to depend on the measure of debt applied. Further, managers of highly levered firms will be 
less able to consume excessive perquisites, since bondholders more closely monitor such firms. The
monitoring costs of this agency relationship are higher for firms with less collateralizable assets.
Therefore, firms with less collateralizable assets might voluntarily choose higher debt levels to limit 
consumption of perquisites (Drobetz and Fix, 2003). Hence, the agency model predicts a negative 
relationship between tangibility of assets and leverage. Firms with more tangible assets have a greater 
ability to secure debt. Alternatively, Grossman and Hart (1982) argue that the agency costs of 
managers consuming more than the optimal level of perquisites is higher for firms with lower levels 
of assets that can be used as collateral. The monitoring costs of the agency relationship are higher 
for firms with less collateralizable assets. Consequently, collateral value is found to be a major 
determinant of the level of debt financing (Omet and Mashharance, 2002). From a pecking order 
theory perspective, firms with few tangible assets are more sensitive to informational asymmetries. 
These firms will thus issue debt rather than equity when they need external financing (Harris and 
Raviv, 1991), leading to an expected negative relation between the importance of intangible assets 
and leverage.
The trade-off theory predicts an inverse relationship between size and the probability of bankruptcy, 
i.e., a positive relationship between size and leverage. However, the pecking order theory of the 
capital structure predicts a negative relationship between size and leverage that is larger firm exhibits 
increasing preference for equity relative to debt. Further, as mentioned by Shapiro and Titman 
(1985) and Castanias (1983), that because of bankruptcy risk, managers would not likely to use debt 
choice. However, since larger firms have a chance to be more diversified, they have relatively little 
bankruptcy risk (Titmand and Wessels, 1988). Warner (1977) suggests that bankruptcy costs would 
be higher for smaller firms. Research evidences for this variable are also ambiguous (Drobetz and 
Fix, 2003). For example, Friend and Hasbrouck (1988), Crutchley and Hansen (1989) and Berger et 
al., (1997) report a positive relationship between firm’s size and leverage, whilst Feri and Jones 
(1979) suggest that firm’s size has a significant impact on leverage even though the sectoral decisions 
have been observed to vary among industries. Rajan and Zingales (1995) argued that larger firms 
tend to be more diversified and fail less often, so size may be an inverse proxy for the probability of 
bankruptcy. Large firms are also expected to incur lower costs in issuing debt or equity. Thus, large 
firms are expected to hold more debt in their capital structure than small firms. The measure of size 
used in this paper is the natural logarithm of net sales similar to the approach followed by Drobetz 
and Fix (2003). They discuss the logarithm of total assets as an alternate; however, they accept the 
net sales as a better proxy for the measure of size.
The trade-off theory suggests that firms with more investment opportunities have less leverage 
because they have stronger incentives to avoid under-investment and asset substitution that can arise 
from stockholder-bondholder agency conflicts (Drobetz and Fix 2003). Therefore, this theory 
predicts a negative relationship between leverage and investment opportunities. In the similar line,
Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow theory suggests that firms with more investment opportunities have 
less need for the disciplining effect of debt payments to control free cash flows. Nevertheless, the 
pecking order theory supports a positive relationship. According to pecking order theory, debt 
typically grows when investment exceeds retained earnings and falls when investment is less than 
retained earnings. The empirical evidence regarding the relationship between leverage and growth 
opportunities are also mixed suggesting the operation of both theories. For example, Titman and 
Wessles (1988), Barclay and Smith (1996) and Chen et al., (1997) find a negative relationship 
between growth opportunities and the level of either long-term or total debt. Similarly, Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) also find a negative relationship between growth opportunities and leverage. They 
suggest that this may be due to firms issuing equity when stock prices are high. As mentioned by 
Hovakimian et al. (2001), large stock price increases are usually associated with improved growth 
opportunities, leading to a lower debt ratio. However, Bevan and Danbolt (2001) find a negative 
relationship between growth and long-term debt, but find total leverage to be positively related to 
the level of growth opportunities. On the other hand, Beran and Danbolt (2001) find short-term 
debt to be positively related to growth opportunities. 
Profitability plays an important role in leverage decisions. In the framework of trade-off theory, 
agency costs, taxes, and bankruptcy costs push more profitable firms toward higher book leverage. 
This is due to first, decline in the expected bankruptcy costs when profitability increases and Second, 
the deductibility of corporate interest payments induces more profitable firms to finance with debt. 
In a tradeoff theory framework, when firms are profitable, they prefer debt to benefit firm the tax 
shield. In addition, if past profitability is a good proxy for future profitability, profitable firms can 
borrow more, as the likelihood of paying back the loans is greater. However, in the agency models 
of Jensen and Meckhing (1976), Easterbook (1984), and Jesen (1986), higher leverage helps control 
agency problems by forcing managers to pay out more of the firm's excess cash. However, the 
pecking-order model predicts a negative relationship between book leverage and profitability. Again, 
the empirical evidence on the issue is mixed. For instance, Toy et al., (1974), Kester (1986), Titman 
and Wessels (1988), Harris and Raviv (1991), Bennett and Donnelly (1993), Rajan and Zingales 
(1995), and Michaeles et al. (1999), Booth et al. (2001), Bevan and Danbolt (2001) all find leverage to 
be negatively related to the level of profitability (supporting the pecking-order theory). Whilst 
Jensen, Solberg and Zorn (1992) find leverage to be positively related to the level of profitability 
(supporting the trade-off theory). To test the effect of profitability on leverage, we use return on 
assets (measured by ratio between Operating Income and Total Assets).
Although interest is tax deductable due to default risk, firms may tend to use other tax shields. Tax 
laws allow certain tax deductions to be made from a company’s taxable income. Depreciation on 
tangibles and intangibles are also tax deductable. The effective tax rate has been used as a possible 
determinant of the capital structure choice. According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), if interest 
payments on debt are tax-deductible, firms with positive taxable income have an incentive to issue 
more debt. That is, the main incentive for borrowing is to take advantage of interest tax shields. 
Accordingly, in the framework of the trade-off theory, one hypothesizes a negative relationship 
between leverage and non-debt tax shields. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) argue that the marginal 
corporate savings from an additional unit of debt decreases with increasing non-debt tax shields. 
This is because of the likelihood of bankruptcy increases with leverage. 
3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA2
3.1. Static Panel Models 
In the panel data framework, there are three types of models mostly used to assess the relationship 
between debt and its determinants. These are: a pooled Ordinary Least Squire (OLS) regression, 
panel model with random effects and the panel model with fixed effects. Following the previously 
defined determinants of debt used in this study one can write a pooled OLS regression in the 
following way:
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where i indexes firms, t indexes time, itLEV is the level of debt (ratio between Total Liabilities and 
Total Assets), itNDTS are non-debt tax shields (ratio between Depreciations and Total Assets), 
itPROF is profitability (ratio between Operating Income and Total Assets), itSIZE is size 
(Logarithm of Total Sales), TANGit is asset structure (ratio between Fixed Assets and Total Assets), 
itEVOL is the level of risk (absolute value of percentage change of Operating Income), itGROWTH
are growth opportunities (Growth of Total Sales), and it is the error term which is assumed to have 
a normal distribution and varies over both country and time. However, by using an pooled OLS 
regression, firms’ unobservable individual effects are not controlled therefore, as Bevan and Danbolt 
(2004) conclude, heterogeneity, a consequence of not considering those effects, can influence 
measurements of the estimated parameters. Nevertheless, it is possible to control the implications of 
firms’ non-observable individual effects on the estimated parameters by using panel models of 
random or fixed effects. Hence, by considering the existence of non-observable individual effects, 
we have can re-write equation(1) as:
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2 This section is heavily based on the work of Serrasqueiro and Nunes (2008).  For the analysis data of all variables is 
obtained Capital line data base for the period 2002 to 2009. 
where ,itiitu   with i being firms’ unobservable individual effects. The difference between a 
polled OLS regression and a model considering unobservable individual effects lies precisely in i .
In our empirical work we used the LM test for testing the relevance of unobservable individual 
effects. The null hypothesis of this test is that unobservable individual effects are irrelevant and 
hence, not rejecting the null hypothesis leads us to conclude that unobservable individual effects are 
not relevant, and so a pooled OLS regression would be an appropriate way of carrying out 
evaluation of debt determinants. However, the contrary, rejection the null hypothesis leads us to 
conclude that a pooled OLS regression is not the most appropriate way of carrying out analysis of 
the relationship between debt and its determinants. 
Even if we have tested for irrelevance of unobservable individual effects of firms, question of 
correlation between firms’ unobservable individual effects and debt determinants in not solved. We 
can proceed with a panel model of random effects, if there is no correlation between firms’ 
unobservable individual effects and debt determinants and if this is present the most appropriate 
way would be a panel model with fixed effects. We used the Hausman test to test the possible 
existence of such a correlation. The null hypothesis of the Hausman test is non-existence of 
correlation between unobservable individual effects and the explanatory variables, in this study, debt 
determinants, against the null hypothesis of existence of correlation. We would proceed with a panel 
model of random effects if the null hypothesis not rejected and if null hypothesis is rejected we 
would proceed with a panel model of fixed effects. Further, based on the results of the LM and 
Hausman tests, we will also present the evaluation of the most appropriate panel model. In addition 
to that, unlike other studies, we have also analyzed the model of two-way effect in which we 
assumed that company specific and period specific effects are random as there is every possibility 
for the presence of both effects simultaneously. 
3.2. Dynamic Panel Estimators 
It would be worthy to mention that static panel models do not allow us to analyze the possible 
dynamism existing in firm decisions when choosing their capital structure. This allows us to evaluate 
the dynamic panel estimators. Further, these models have greater power to control endogenity and 
allow us to determine the level of adjustment of actual debt towards optimal level of debt. We can 
describe that adjustment process as follows: 
)( 1,
*
,1,,   titititi LEVLEVLEVLEV  ……….(3)
where tiLEV , is the actual debt of company i in period t, 1, tiLEV is the actual debt of company i in 
period t-1 and, *,tiLEV is the optimal debt of company i in period t. Regrouping the terms and 
solving to the order of tiLEV , , we have:
))1( 1,
*
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If 1 we have *,, titi LEVLEV  , the actual level of debt being equal to the optimal level of debt
forcing firms to manage an optimal capital structure. On the contrary, if, 0 we have 
1,,  titi LEVLEV i.e., there is no adjustment of the level of actual debt towards the optimal level of 
debt. Therefore, a high values of  , means a close proximity of the level of actual debt to optimal 
level of debt, whereas a low values of , means less proximity between the actual level of debt and 
optimal level of debt.
It is important to mention that the optimal level of debt depends on firms’ specific characteristics 
that are on the determinants considered relevant in explaining debt as pointed out by Kremp et al. 
(1999), Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Miguel and Pindado (2001), Ozkan (2001) and Gaud et al. 
(2005). Therefore, the optimal level of debt is given by:
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Substituting (5) in (4), and solving to the order of tiLEV , , we have:
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Where, )1(   , 00   , 11   , 22   33   44   , 55   , 66   ,
ii   and itite 
To control the correlation between i and 1, tiLEV and between ite and 1, tiLEV in estimating 
equation (6) using static panel models which can give biased and inconsistent of the evaluated 
parameters, Arellano and Bond (1991) propose evaluation of the equation (6) with the variables in 
first differences, and the use of debt lags and its determinants at level as instruments. However,
Blundell and Bond (1998) concluded that when the dependent variable is persistent, there being a 
high correlation between its values in the current period and in the previous period, and the number 
of periods is not very high, the GMM (1991) estimator is inefficient; the instruments used generally 
being weak. For such cases by considering a system with variables at level and first differences
Blundell and Bond (1998) extend the GMM (1991) estimator. For the variables at level in equation 
(6), the instruments are the variables lagged in first differences. In the case of the variables in first 
differences in equation (6), the instruments are those lagged variables at level. However the GMM 
(1991) and GMM system (1998) dynamic estimators can only be considered robust on confirmation 
of two conditions: 1) if the restrictions created, a consequence of using the instruments, are valid; 
and 2) there is no second order autocorrelation. Therefore, to test the validity of the restrictions we 
use the Sargan test in the case of the GMM (1991) estimator and the GMM system (1998) estimator. 
The null hypothesis in the Sargan test indicates the restrictions imposed by use of the instruments 
are valid against the alternative hypothesis that the restrictions are not valid. Rejection of the null 
hypothesis leads us to conclude that the estimators are not robust. Further, we also test for the 
existence of first and second order autocorrelation through Arellano and Bond (1991) test. The null 
hypothesis is that there is no autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis being the existence of 
autocorrelation. Rejection of the null hypothesis of existence of second order autocorrelation leads 
us to conclude that the estimators are not robust. 
4. RESULTS 
Before conducting regression analysis, correlation analysis was carried out in order to find out 
whether there is any evidence of severe multicollinearity among the test variables.3 Since we do not 
find evidence of multicollinearity (see appendix 1), regression analysis has been carried out with 
incorporation of all variables simultaneously. First, we present the results of the static panel model 
analysis. Results of static panel data models have been presented in table 1. 
Table 1: Regression results of Static Panel data models
Panel data Models: Dependent variable is LEVi,t; standard error in parenthesis
Independent 
variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
OLS FE-CS RE-CS RE-CS with 
AR(1)
RE-CS-Time
NDTS i,t
-0.20313***
(0.0342)
-0.1765***
(0.04823)
-0.1826***
(0.04259)
-0.20014***
(0.04715)
-0.194059***
(0.0429)
PROFi,t
-0.006817
(0.004960)
0.001064
(0.0028295)
0.0005335
(0.002818)
0.0006793
(0.0021408)
0.000935
(0.002816)
SIZEi,t
-0.000681
(0.003533)
-0.0078***
(0.0023)
-0.00721***
(0.00227)
-0.004512**
(0.00216)
-0.006968**
(0.003305)
TANGi,t
0.178434***
(0.0395)
0.118618***
(0.0390)
0.12826***
(0.03679)
0.11302***
(0.039502)
0.114088***
(0.03699)
EVOLi,t
-8.00E-05**
(4.05E-05)
-6.10e-06
(0.000023)
-9.32e-06
(0.0000232)
-0.000018
(0.0000188)
-8.46E-06
(2.33E-05)
GROWTH i,t
5.66E-06*
(3.13E-06)
1.08e-06
(1.80e-06)
1.30e-06
(1.79e-06)
2.42e-06*
(1.40e-06)
1.14E-06
(1.79E-06)
C
0.293354***
(0.029958)
0.35348***
(0.02466)
0.347997***
(0.0317)
0.3405797***
(0.0309)
0.35517***
(0.03619)
Model summary 
R2 0.066562 0.773270 0.049241 ---------------- 0.039332
F-test 8.473773*** 5.33*** 6.154503*** -------------- 4.865314***
Rho AR --------- -------- -------------   0.51275378   ----------
Cross-section 
random S.D.
------------ 0.2077346 0.20115479 0.19221114 0.201223
Idiosyncratic 
random S.D.
-------------- 0.12428549 0.12428549 0.1116443 0.123394
Rho ------------- 0.73640379 0.72371944   0.74773208 0.7231
Theta ---------------- ------------- ------------- 0.64886484 ------------
Period random 
S.D
--------------------- --------------- ---------------- ---------------- 0.016621
BP-LM test ------------- ------------- chi2(1) = 1269.64*** -------------- ---------------
Hausman test ------------ ------------- chi2(4)= 6.59 --------------- --------------
Fixed effect  (F-
test)
----------- F(89,624)=    21.85*** ------------ --------------- --------------
Wald chi2 ------------ ----------- 36.93*** 28.77*** --------------
Firms included  90 90 90 90 90
Total 170 170 170 170
                                                          
3  It is important to mention that though we do not have evidence of sever multicollinearity between the variables 
analyzed. But correlation is somewhat higher between EVOLi,t  and GROWTH i,t and hence provide evidence of near 
multicollinearity however, care should be taken in analyzing the correlation matrix presented in Appendix 1, since it is 
computed by ignoring the panel structure of the data and that is utilized for analysis. 
observations 170
Notes: 1. The LM test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis that unobservable individual effects are irrelevant in explaining the dependent 
variable, against the alternative hypothesis of relevance of unobservable individual effects in explaining the dependent variable. 2. The Hausman test has 
χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis that unobservable individual effects are not correlated with the explanatory variables, against the null 
hypothesis of correlation between unobservable individual effects and the explanatory variables. 3. The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null 
hypothesis of insignificance as a whole of the parameters of the explanatory variables, against the alternative hypothesis of significance as a whole of the 
parameters of the explanatory variables. 4. The F test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of insignificance as a whole of the 
estimated parameters, against the alternative hypothesis of significance as a whole of the estimated parameters. 5. ***, **, and *denote significance at 1, 5 
and 10 % level of significance respectively. 6. EF, CS, BP-LM, SD denotes fixed-effect, cross-section, Breusch and Pagan’s Lagrange multiplier for 
random effect, and standard deviation respectively. 7. [----] denotes results are not computed. 
Source: Author’s calculation 
From analysis of the results of the Wald and F tests, we can conclude that we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the explanatory variables do not explain, taken as a whole, the explained variable, 
and so the determinants selected in this study can be considered explanatory of the debt. 
The results of the LM test indicate we can reject the null hypothesis, at 1% significance, that firms’ 
unobservable individual effects are not significant. Therefore, a pooled OLS regression will not be 
the most appropriate way of carrying out evaluation of the relationship between debt and its 
determinants, since we do not consider the heterogeneity of firms, a heterogeneity which cannot be 
measured by the relationship between debt and its determinants. However, the results of the 
Hausman test show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of absence of correlation between 
firms’ unobservable individual effects and debt determinants. Therefore, we can conclude that the 
most appropriate way to carry out evaluation of the relationship between debt and its determinants 
is evaluation of a random effects panel model. The similarity of the results obtained in terms of sign 
and significance of the coefficients of variables, using random or fixed effects, shows that the 
correlation between unobservable individual effects and debt determinants is not relevant. 
Therefore, and given the possible existence of autocorrelation, we assess the random effects panel 
model, consistent with the existence of first order autocorrelation. In the final step of static panel 
data model, i.e., model 5, we also estimated the model of two-way effect wherein both cross-section 
and period specific effects are assumed fixed. 
Next we present the results of the GMM (1991) and GMM system (1998) dynamic estimators. The 
results are presented in table 2. The results of the Wald tests allow us to conclude that the 
determinants used in this study can be considered, as a whole, explanatory of the debt. 
Table 2: GMM (1991) and GMM (1998) estimates result
Panel data Models: Dependent variable is LEVi,t; standard error in parenthesis
Independent variables GMM (1991) GMM (1998)
LEVi,t-1
0.4940653***
(0.0751869)
0.4545991***
(0.0710414)
NDTS i,t
-0.2551332***
(0.0674686)
-0.2157173***
(0.0513694)
PROFi,t
0.0010241
(0.0016644)
0.0004238 
(0.0014219)
SIZEi,t
-0.0228289**
(0.0104641)
-0.0231829***
(0.0073044)
TANGi,t
0.0754454
(0.0497679)
0.1068677***
(0.037752)
EVOLi,t
-0.0000392
(0.0000285)
-0.000028
(0.0000244)
GROWTHi,t
4.19e-06**
(1.73e-06)
3.54e-06**
( 1.46e-06)
C
0.358712***
(0.0966603)
0.3393815***
(0.0656582)
Model summary 
Wald chi2 214.88*** 225.62***
AB test 
Z1= -2.0867**
Z2= 1.2007
Z1= -2.1744**
Z2= 1.216
Sargan test chi2(20)     =  32.64561** chi2(26)     =  38.88394**
Firms included 90 90
Total observations 170 170
Notes: 1. In the GMM(1991) estimator the instruments used are ),,(
1
2,,2, 


n
K
tikti ZLEV in which 2,, tikZ are the debt 
determinants lagged two periods. 2. In the GMM system (1998) estimators the instruments used are 
),,(
1
2,,2, 


n
K
tikti ZLEV in the first difference equations, and ),,(
1
2,,2, 

 
n
K
tikti ZLEV in the level equations. 3. 
The Wald test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of overall non-significance of the parameters of the explanatory 
variables, against the alternative hypothesis of overall significance of the parameters of the explanatory variables. 4. The Sargan 
test has χ2 distribution and tests the null hypothesis of significance of the validity of the instruments used, against the 
alternative hypothesis of non-validity of the instruments used. 5. The Z1 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null 
hypothesis of absence of first order autocorrelation, against the alternative hypothesis of existence of first order 
autocorrelation. 6. The Z2 test has normal distribution N(0,1) and tests the null hypothesis of absence of second order 
autocorrelation against the alternative hypothesis of existence of second order autocorrelation. 7. Standard deviations in 
brackets. 8. *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant at 5% significance; * significant at 10% significance. 
Source: Author’s calculation 
From the results of the Sargan tests, we can conclude that we can reject the null hypothesis of 
instrument validity, and consequent restrictions generated, from use of the GMM (1991) and GMM 
system (1998) dynamic estimators respectively. However, the results of the second order 
autocorrelation tests concerning respectively the GMM (1991) and GMM system (1998) dynamic 
estimators, allow us to conclude that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of absence of second 
order autocorrelation. Therefore, given the validity of the absence of second order autocorrelation, 
but instruments invalidity we cannot conclude that the GMM (1991) and GMM system (1998) 
dynamic estimators are efficient and robust. 
5. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Next, we present the comparison of the results of the models previously presented. First, we 
compare the results of the static panel models, then we compare the results of the dynamic panel 
estimators, and finally we go on to compare the results of the static and dynamic panel estimators. 
The summary of the results of the signs and statistical significance concerning the relationship 
between debt and its determinants are presented in the following table. 
5.1. Comparison of the Results of Static Panel Models 
Observing the results presented in Table 1, we can conclude the results of a pooled OLS regression 
are different from those obtained using panel models of random and fixed effects. The first 
difference is related to the relationship between profitability and debt. Whereas using a pooled OLS 
regression the estimated parameter is negative, considering a panel model with random or fixed 
effects, the relationship becomes positive though insignificant statistically in all cases. The second 
difference is related with the relationship between itEVOL and debt. Whereas using polled OLS 
regression the estimated parameter is statistically significantly negative, considering a panel model 
with fixed and random effects though the relationship is negative but statistically insignificant. The 
third difference is related to the relationship between sales and debt. Whereas sales is negative but 
insignificant in case of polled OLS, considering the model of panel with fixed and random effect 
sales turned to be statistically significantly negative. The fourth difference is related to the 
relationship between growth and debt. Whereas growth is significant with positive sign in case of 
polled OLS, considering the case of panel with fixed and random effect growth turned to be 
insignificant but sign remains the same. 
Further, considering the relevance of unobservable individual effects, given by the results of the LM 
test, we can draw the following conclusions from the results of the static panel models: 1) there is a 
negative and statistically significant relationship between nondebt tax shields and debt; 2) there is a 
negative and statistically significant relationship between sales and debt; 3) there is a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between growth and debt; 4) there is a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between ratio of fixed assets to total assets and debt; and 5) statistically, the 
relationships between profitability and debt and POCI and debt are not significant. 
5.2. Comparison of the Results of the Dynamic Panel Estimators 
Comparing the results of the dynamic estimators GMM (1991) and GMM system (1998), we find 
that the coefficient of ratio of fixed assets to total assets is insignificant in case of GMM (1991) 
while significant in case of GMM (1998) and all other results are same in terms of sign and 
significance of the explanatory variable under consideration. 
Using the GMM (1991) dynamic estimator, we obtain an impact of debt in the previous period on 
debt in the current period which is statistically significant at 1% significance, of δ = 0.494, and so 
with δ = (1-α), we have an adjustment of actual debt towards optimal level of debt of α = 0.506. 
Applying the GMM system (1998) dynamic estimator the impact of debt in the previous period on 
debt in the current period is statistically significant at 1% significance, of δ = 0.455, and so 
adjustment of actual debt towards optimal level of debt is α = 0.545. 
The parameter measuring the impact of non-debt tax shields on debt is negative using both GMM 
(1991) and GMM system (1998) dynamic estimators and statistical significant at 1% level. As for as
the relationships between other explanatory variables and debt is concerned we find that growth is 
positively significant in both cases; profitability is insignificant in both cases though carries positive 
sign; sales is negatively significant in both cases; POCI insignificant but carries negative sign in both 
cases and ratio of fixed assets to total assets is insignificant in case of GMM (1991) while significant 
in case of GMM (1998) though carries positive sign in both cases. However, it should be noted that 
results obtained from GMM (1991) and GMM (1998) are not robust, as assumption of instrument 
validity do not hold good.4
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The study was intended to identify the determinants of capital structure for Indian firms using a 
panel framework. For the analysis, we have taken 90 firms during the period 2002-2009, comprising 
of a panel model with fixed and random effects. We also used GMM (1991) and GMM (1998) 
estimates in our analysis. We found that that results obtained from the GMM (1991) and GMM 
(1998) are not robust as the assumption of instrument validity was not found to hold good. 
Therefore, based upon LM test and Hausmant test, we conclude that: 1) there is a negative and 
statistically significant relationship between non-debt tax shields and debt; 2) there is a negative and 
statistically significant relationship between sales/size and debt; 3) there is a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between growth and debt; 4) there is a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between ratio of fixed assets to total assets and debt; and 5) the relationships between 
profitability and debt and POCI and debt are not statistically significant. 
Further, we find that the Indian firms adjust the level of actual debt towards the optimal level of 
debt with speed of adjustment between 0.50 and 0.55, which is profound when compared with 
adjustments of other country firms. Kremp et al. (1999) obtain values for adjustment coefficients of 
0.53 and 0.28 for Germany and France respectively, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) 0.59 for the 
United States, Miguel and Pindado (2001) 0.79 for Spain, Ozkan (2001) 0.57 for the United 
Kingdom and Gaud et al. (2005) values between 0.14 and 0.387, according to the type of debt used, 
for Switzerland. 
We find a negative and statistically significant relationship between non-debt tax shields and debt 
and so we can conclude that Indian firms do reduce debt, given the greater possibility of non-debt 
tax shields. 
We confirm the existence of a positive relationship, though insignificant, between profitability and 
debt. This result suggests the most profitable Indian firms resort more to debt rather opting first for 
internal financing. 
Given the negative and statistically significant relationship between size/sales and debt, we conclude 
that smaller firms turn more to debt than larger firms, since the former do not have enough stuff to 
go for internal financing therefore only external sources are left for them. 
Further, we find a positive statistically significant relationship between asset structure and debt. This 
implies that asset structure of the firms also plays dominant role in debt seeking. We also find a
                                                          
4 Summary of all results relating to sign and significance of the parameters related to the variables is presented in 
appendix 2. 
positive statistically significant relationship between growth opportunities and debt. This implies that 
to achieve higher and higher growth Indian firms go for debt financing.  
Finally, we do not find a statistically significant relationship between level of risk and debt and 
between growth profitability and debt. Based on the results obtained, we cannot conclude that a 
greater level of collaterals contributes to firms increasing debt, that a higher level of risk contributes 
to decreasing debt or that firm’s use debt to finance their growth. 
To sum up, we can conclude that Indian firms adjust the actual level of debt towards the optimal 
level of debt and the level of adjustment is substantial. Size, growth opportunities, capital structure
and non-debt tax shields can be considered determinant factors in explaining the capital structure of 
Indian firms, and consequently in explaining the adjustment towards optimal level of debt. 
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Appendix 1: Descriptive statistics & correlation analysis
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
LEVi,t NDTS i,t PROFi,t SIZEi,t TANGi,t EVOLi,t GROWTHi,t
Mean 0.292653 0.300254 0.261199 6.954037 0.386395 40.72013 197.6891
Median 0.291171 0.216359 0.255022 7.373254 0.361368 20.82680 19.07655
Maximum 1.101908 1.848915 2.346667 12.63313 1.799929 7152.750 117407.5
Minimum 0.000000 0.000000 -33.40313 0.000000 0.000000 -3489.543 -74.97216
Std. Dev. 0.243161 0.281408 1.795818 2.510073 0.244647 339.0820 4379.802
Skewness 0.402393 2.026714 -17.99475 -0.830592 0.934493 13.03922 26.67762
Kurtosis 2.231777 8.338604 335.9027 3.262921 5.068553 304.8653 714.3571
Jarque-Bera 37.13537 1347.929 3363583. 84.85980 233.1606 2754083. 1526627
Probability 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000
Source: Author’s calculation 
Table 2: Pearson’s correlation analysis
LEVi,t NDTS i,t PROFi,t SIZEi,t TANGi,t EVOLi,t GROWTHi,t
LEVi,t 1
NDTS i,t -0.1722 1
PROFi,t -0.05786 0.08840 1
SIZEi,t -0.02550 0.0540 0.0975041 1
TANGi,t 0.08744 0.3940 0.09661851 -0.01650 1
EVOLi,t -0.047603 0.023040 0.02717152 0.00370 -0.03995 1
GROWTHi,t 0.01941
-
0.0047070 -0.0035461 0.024669 0.00845 0.76384 1
Source: Author’s calculation
Appendix 2
Table 3: Summary of the results of applying the various estimators: Empirical evidence for India
LEVi,t Expected 
Sign 
OLS Fixed 
effect
Random 
effect 
Random 
effect 
AR(1) 
Two-way
Random 
effect
GMM 
(1991)
GMM 
(1998)
LEVi,t-1 + ---- ------ --------- ------- ------- +*** +***
NDTS i,t - -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -***
PROFi,t - -(n.s.) +(n.s.) +(n.s.) +(n.s.) +(n.s.) +(n.s.) +(n.s.)
SIZEi,t + -(n.s.) -*** -*** -** -** -** -***
TANGi,t + +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +(n.a) +***
EVOLi,t - -** -(n.s.) -(n.s.) -(n.s.) -(n.s.) -(n.s.) -(n.s.)
GROWTHi,t + +* +(n.s.) +(n.s.) +* +(n.s.) +** +**
Note: (1) n.s. denotes not significant and (2) *** significant at 1% significance; ** significant at 5% significance; * significant at 10% 
significance.
Source: Author’s calculation 
Appendix 3
Table 4: BSE listed companies considered for analysis
SL.No Name of the company SL.No Name of the company
1 Aban Offshore Ltd 46 Lanco Infratech Ltd
2 ABB Ltd 47 Larsen & Toubro Ltd
3 AIA Engineering Ltd 48 Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd
4 Apollo Hospitals Enterprise Ltd 49 Maruti Suzuki India Ltd
5 Areva T&D India Ltd 50 Mcleod Russel India Ltd
6 Aurobindo Pharma Ltd 51 MphasiS Ltd
7 BEML Ltd 52 MRF Ltd
8 Bharat Electronics Ltd 53 National Aluminium Company Ltd
9 Bharat Forge Ltd 54 Neyveli Lignite Corporation Ltd
10 Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd 55 NHPC Ltd
11 Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd 56 NMDC Ltd
12 Biocon Ltd 57 NTPC Ltd
13 Blue Star Ltd 58 Oil & Natural Gas Corpn Ltd
14 Cadila Healthcare Ltd 59 Opto Circuits (India) Ltd
15 Cipla Ltd 60 Oracle Financial Services Software Ltd
16 Colgate-Palmolive (India) Ltd 61 Orchid Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals Ltd
17 Crompton Greaves Ltd 62 Patni Computer Systems Ltd
18 Cummins India Ltd 63 Piramal Healthcare Ltd
19 Divis Laboratories Ltd 64 Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd
20 Dabur India Ltd 65 Praj Industries Ltd
21 Dr Reddys Laboratories Ltd 66 Punj Lloyd Ltd
22 Essar Oil Ltd 67 Rajesh Exports Ltd
23 Financial Technologies (India) Ltd 68 Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd
24 GAIL (India) Ltd 69 Reliance Industrial Infrastructure Ltd
25 Gammon India Ltd 70 Reliance Industries Ltd
26 Gitanjali Gems Ltd 71 Reliance Infrastructure Ltd
27 Glaxosmithkline Pharma Ltd 72 Rolta India Ltd
28 Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Ltd 73 Ruchi Soya Industries Ltd
29 Godrej Consumer Products Ltd 74 Sesa Goa Ltd
30 GVK Power & Infrastructure Ltd 75 Siemens Ltd
31 Havells India Ltd 76 Steel Authority of India Ltd
32 HCL Technologies Ltd 77 Sterlite Industries (India) Ltd
33 Hero Honda Motors Ltd 78 Sun Pharmaceuticals Industries Ltd
34 Hindalco Industries Ltd 79 Suzlon Energy Ltd
35 Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd 80 Tata Motors Ltd
36 Hindustan Zinc Ltd 81 Tata Power Company Ltd
37 Indian Oil Corporation Ltd 82 Tata Steel Ltd
38 Infosys Technologies Ltd 83 Tech Mahindra Ltd
39 ITC Ltd 84 Thermax Ltd
40 Jindal Steel & Power Ltd 85 United Spirits Ltd
41 JSW Energy Ltd 86 Usha Martin Ltd
42 JSW Steel Ltd 87 Videocon Industries Ltd
43 Jubilant Organosys Ltd 88 Welspun Corp Ltd
44 Jyoti Structures Ltd 89 Whirlpool of India Ltd
45 Lakshmi Machine Works Ltd 90 Wipro Ltd
Source: Author’s calculation
